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Abstract The nuclear engineer emerged as a new form of recognised technical
professional between 1940 and the early 1960s as nuclear fission, the chain reaction
and their applications were explored. The institutionalization of nuclear engineer-
ing—channelled into new national laboratories and corporate design offices during
the decade after the war, and hurried into academic venues thereafter—proved
unusually dependent on government definition and support. This paper contrasts the
distinct histories of the new discipline in the USA and UK (and, more briefly,
Canada). In the segregated and influential environments of institutional laboratories
and factories, historical actors such as physicist Walter Zinn in the USA and
industrial chemist Christopher Hinton in the UK proved influential in shaping the
roles and perceptions of nuclear specialists. More broadly, I argue that the State-
managed implantation of the new subject within further and higher education cur-
ricula was shaped strongly by distinct political and economic contexts in which
secrecy, postwar prestige and differing industrial cultures were decisive factors.
Keywords Discipline  Nuclear engineer  University  Expertise 
Training  National laboratory
Introduction
During the twentieth century, and particularly from the 1930s, nuclear physics was
one of the most rapidly growing fields of scientific knowledge. Dramatically
accelerated by the Second World War, this expertise was marshalled to develop not
just the first nuclear weapons but also civilian applications. The post-war
capabilities of ‘atomic energy’—copious production of radiation to transmute
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elements, to create radioisotopes for medical applications and to generate power—
grew in tandem with the new field of nuclear engineering. Owing to the strategic
importance of the subject for military supremacy, national prestige, energy policy
and international trade, the discipline, occupation and profession of nuclear
engineering were driven by government definition and support.1
Accounts of the field have focused on its wartime origins, particularly of key
historical actors (e.g. Compton 1956, Hartcup and Allibone 1984, Brown 1997;
Bernstein 2004), policy-making (Gowing 1964; Hewlett and Duncan 1969) and the
development of commercial nuclear power (Pocock 1977; Bothwell 1988).
Comparisons of nuclear programs (de Leon 1979) and of the identity of engineering
professions (Downey and Lucena 2004) have contrasted differing national contexts.
However, nuclear engineering as a body of expertise has attracted relatively little
attention, and studies of its academic origins are sparse.
I argue that this lack of attention to its specialists is a consequence of the unusual
context in which nuclear engineering developed. In an environment of secrecy and
military urgency during the war and for a decade thereafter, practitioners were
restricted from open academic discourse; indeed, apart from a handful of high-
profile scientists publicly representing the new domain, the early historical actors
and developing expertise were largely invisible. As a result, nuclear engineers were
peculiarly voiceless, and the development of self-perception and shared identity was
constrained. From the mid 1950s, though, national haste to demonstrate peaceful
civilian applications pushed nuclear engineering into university curricula. A
consequence for the historian is a relative dearth of documents relating to nascent
community identity and aspirations, but more readily traced emergence of the
academic discipline.
This paper contrasts the distinct histories of nuclear engineering’s academic
embedding in the countries that had first collaborated in the field as wartime allies:
the USA, UK and (more briefly) Canada. It documents an atypical disciplinary
trajectory in which governments played the key role in defining intellectual content,
occupational categories and professional aspirations for the emerging field.
Implantation of the discipline within further and higher education curricula was
shaped strongly by political and economic contexts, and was configured differently
in each country owing to distinct national goals and administrative cultures.
Core Knowledge
The root of nuclear engineering’s disparate trajectories lay in dissimilar conceptions
of how the intellectual subject and its skills set should be constituted. The novelty of
this engineering domain was disputed. Its proponents focused on new intellectual
expertise supporting a novel occupational context: the design and operation of
1 By ‘discipline’ I mean the intellectual foundations, specialized skills, educational institutionalization
and academic allegiances supporting a self-recognised coherent body of knowledge. I distinguish this
from the aspects of ‘occupation’—the pursuit of productive activity—and ‘profession’—the community
interactions and recognised status attaching to disciplinary and occupational expertise. This distinction
follows the approach of Abbott (1988) and of Divall and Johnston (2000).
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nuclear reactors.2 But how was the nuclear reactor perceived by, and involved in the
shaping of, its creators and users?
On the face of it, the first reactors were mundane devices. Their original name,
piles, mirrored their construction, originally a compact assembly or lattice-work
mountain of materials. Their visible characteristics were also unexciting: such piles
generated heat, which was removed either to keep them cool or to generate useful
electrical power. For power generation, well-established engineering principles
were applied—principles developed over the previous two centuries to collect and
transfer the heat via an exchange medium such as water, steam or gas, and to
convert it to mechanical motion and electrical power with turbines. Other design
principles were just as traditionally established: how to package the materials in
mechanical structures that were mechanically, structurally, chemically and
thermally stable; and how to ensure reliable operation of these factory-sized
environments of interlinked mechanical, electrical and thermal systems.
But the first reactors had unfamiliar purposes and invisible characteristics, too.
Their goal, specified by the Manhattan Project, was to generate a sustained chain-
reaction of radioactive materials, and to use this controlled fission to transmute them
into new elements, one of which (plutonium) would be used in bombs.3 This deeper
function, revealed publicly after the war, was the source of their new name: chain-
reactors or, soon after, reactors.4
Underlying the potential of the chain reaction lay rapidly expanding knowledge
of nuclear physics, chemistry and metallurgy and a comparable wave of novel
engineering expertise. A more sophisticated variety of reactor, the so-called
breeder, further advanced prospects for a specialist discipline. Conceived during the
war as a means of avoiding the predicted limited world supply of uranium, the
breeder reactor produces more radioactive fuel than it consumes, but at the expense
of greater technical complexity. Most designs relied on energetic ‘fast’ neutrons to
transmute natural uranium or thorium into plutonium, for which efficient chemical
extraction and reprocessing techniques were needed. Typical designs required high
radiation levels and temperatures in the core—both conditions little understood
initially—and sophisticated liquid metal cooling systems for removal of heat. Its
novel regime of operation demanded theoretical understandings and practical
solutions well beyond conventional engineering knowledge, and offered a perpetual
resource that would benefit from continual development, thus boosting the prospects
of a specialist discipline of nuclear engineering.
2 Indeed, institutions highlighted this new terrain. The UK Atomic Energy Authority vaunted its role to
‘design, build and operate new types of reactor’ (Jay 1956, p. v). Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd identified
its business as ‘creation of atomic energy’ [Atomic Research Workers Union, No. 24291, Applicant—and
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Respondent. LAC RG145 Vol 114 File 766:336:52].
3 The Nagasaki bomb was based on plutonium generated in nuclear reactors designed at the
‘Metallurgical Laboratory’ (‘Met Lab’) of the University of Chicago. By contrast, the Hiroshima
uranium bomb relied on the separation of the isotope U-235 from the almost indistinguishable U-238 in
uranium-rich ores, for which processes based on gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation and
centrifuges were developed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
4 An alternate etymology credits wartime chemical engineers, designers of chemical ‘reactors’, with
making an analogy between chemical and nuclear production. The competing origins are significant, as
they attribute authority over the new domain to different technical specialists.
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As varieties of reactor systems proliferated, engineering knowledge developed
alongside new scientific insights. For instance, the first plutonium production
reactor, at Hanford, Washington, proved to be temporarily ‘poisoned’ by the
production of an unexpected fission product which disastrously diminished the chain
reaction rate (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996). Other operational discoveries revealed the
alteration of structural properties of reactor materials by irradiation. And nuclear
power reactors, despite functioning as mere heat generators, were qualitatively
different from conventional power plants: the materials themselves were or could
become radioactive, posing biological dangers that required elaborate safety
systems. These invisible factors introduced unanticipated variables into the arts of
metallurgy, thermal design, chemical engineering and mechanical engineering.
The nature of this hybrid discipline was, then, defined by the nuclear reactor and
its multiple design parameters and products. Metallurgists and materials engineers
were faced with unknown processes of distortion, embrittlement and transformation
of fuel rods and cooling pipes, necessitating experimental testing in a reactor
environment. Civil and mechanical engineers saw the reactor as a perversely precise
large-scale construction. Thermal engineers tackled the challenge of extracting heat
from the energy-dense core, and ensuring that these heat-transfer systems operated
reliably in lethally radioactive environments barred to direct human manipulation.5
Chemical engineers developed processes to separate nearly identical elements,
crucial in accumulating material for bombs or for reuse in reactors.
Nuclear engineering thus developed in a technical context that was both
seductively familiar and thoroughly mysterious. Some professions—pipefitters and
civil engineers, for example—felt confident to perform their traditional roles with
only slightly extended knowledge and safety precautions. Others, such as
metallurgists and chemical engineers, were required to accommodate new materials,
technologies and constraints, transforming their disciplinary expertise in the
process. And still other domains, such as reactor engineering and its experts, were
wholly new.
Secrecy, the State and Disciplinary Constraints
This technical ground was explored on political terrain: wartime military and
subsequent Cold War secrecy. Expertise in nuclear reactors was closely affiliated
with knowledge useful for bomb production. Nevertheless, there was an early
division of labour between designers of reactors and bombs at distinct locations.6
While both operated initially in secrecy, their intellectual environments and goals
increasingly diverged. Bomb design was a particularly unfertile endpoint, providing
5 Damage to early reactors by thermal run-away was not rare, although the later Three Mile Island (1979)
and Chernobyl (1986) events gained greater public attention. Earlier incidents from which engineering
experience was gleaned included those at NRX, the first large Canadian reactor (1952), Windscale (1957)
in Britain, the Santa Susana Field Laboratory near Los Angeles (1959) and the SL-1 reactor in Idaho
(1961).
6 This separation was dictated early. Los Alamos and Aldermaston focused on bomb design in the USA
and UK, respectively; Canada had no such site. Argonne and Oak Ridge (USA), Harwell (UK) and Chalk
River (Canada) focused on reactor development.
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increasingly sophisticated weapons designs but a dearth of other applications under
its self-limiting shroud of concealment. Nuclear reactors, on the other hand, could
generate a spectrum of new isotopes. They encouraged the development of new
chemical and physical processes, and promised open civilian benefits, from new
forms of medical treatment to power generation. The broader promise of ‘atomic
energy’, then, offered a convergence of interests to unite a variety of engineers,
physicists, chemists and biologists in an inchoate field.
Its wartime origins and Cold War expansion nevertheless shaped the nascent
discipline. Guarding the ‘secret’ of the atomic bomb (Herken 1980) preoccupied
administrators of the Manhattan Project and its civilian successors in the USA, UK
and Canada.
Periodic restrictions on nuclear information-sharing between the Allies during
the war had been motivated by concerns about unequal exchange, potential
commercial exploitation and loss of information to the Soviet Union. The secure
wartime sites were geographically isolated. The US McMahon Act of 1946, seeking
to contain this strategically important expertise, curtailed international collaboration
and segregated research and development not only between but within the three
countries. ‘Atomic spy’ scandals involving Allan Nunn May (1946), Klaus Fuchs
(1950), Bruno Pontecorvo (1950) and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (1951), linked to
the atomic energy programs of all three countries, further heightened institutional
suspicions of Soviet espionage. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hearings of 1950–1954
on communist infiltration of government encouraged the US Congress to require
FBI security investigations of all National Laboratory employees and visitors.
British and Canadian security policies tightened in an attempt to safeguard their
technical expertise and to reverse American isolationism. Indeed, Britain’s post-war
Division of Atomic Energy was more cautious than its American counterpart,
restricting information about reactors, instrumentation and health physics and
concealing its atomic bomb project from the public until the first detonation in 1952.
Security policies further inhibited unionisation and the formation of professional
societies, the typical markers of technical identity.7
Mobility of specialist workers was constrained by fears of transporting secrets
across national borders. The McMahon Act discouraged Americans from joining
foreign establishments, and US security procedures excluded foreigners from most
sites. For the same reason, specialist publications, training and academic exchange
7 Although differently configured in the USA, UK and Canada, labour representation for nuclear workers
was shaped by secrecy. Until the early 1950s, collective representation was discouraged by the AEC on
the grounds of national security, but the Commission did not actively resist unionisation efforts by the
American Federation of Labour and later the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers’ Union (1955). In
Canada, without an overt military dimension to protect, new unions such as the Atomic Research
Workers’ Union (1952) emerged earlier to represent Chalk River workers, but promiscuously included
those linked only by the occupational environment of atomic energy. In the UK, by contrast, workers
were accommodated by existing unions; a short-lived Atomic Workers union disappeared in part owing to
its lack of recognition by the UKAEA, which remained vigilant in discouraging left-wing sympathies
[National Union of Atomic Workers 1958-63. NA FS 27/406]. Such State pressures are also discernable
in the demise of the Atomic Scientists’ Association in 1959 after government spokesmen criticised its
report on the medical effects of fallout from the British H-bomb [The Atomic Scientists Association Ltd:
policy and associated correspondence 1950–1951: 1954–1959. NA AB 27/6; Atomic Scientists
Association’s general correspondence 1946–1951. NA AB 16/52].
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were restricted; the field had no open scientific meetings, courses, journals and few
books until the mid 1950s.
Secrecy, then, had a profound fallout for nuclear workers. It cloistered nuclear
engineering expertise, encouraging nationally distinct specialists, and concentrated
all aspects of discipline-building for the new field in the hands of government.
The Nucleus of a Post-war Discipline
American Definition at National Laboratories
At the centre of defining a new discipline lay the problem of training nuclear
specialists. Teaching such topics—albeit classified material to screened audiences—
began on a small scale in the USA immediately after the war. Administration of the
wartime Manhattan Project facilities was transferred to the new Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) in 1946, with Argonne IL, Oak Ridge TN and Brookhaven NY
becoming the first ‘National Laboratories’. Formally dissociated from military
development, they were conceived as a source of facilities, projects and expertise
for academic researchers at regional American universities.
Walter Zinn, the first Director of Argonne National Lab (ANL), played an
influential role in defining American nuclear engineering. As one of the most senior
designers of wartime piles, he recognised that the expertise gained by the Chicago
‘Met Lab’ could be consolidated. Zinn focused the objectives of ANL on pile
design, construction and fundamental research.8
Zinn’s establishment accumulated workers with wartime experience. As a result,
key designers and administrators in American nuclear engineering during the
following decades had backgrounds rich in practically acquired knowledge. A
typical example is Martin Shaw, who served at ANL as Director of the Division of
Reactor Development and Technology from 1964 until the 1970s. Like Zinn, Shaw
had notched up an impressive list of achievements in a career that grew with the
subject. Having begun his career in engineering works, he served in the Navy during
the war and obtained degrees in Mechanical Engineering after it. From the late
1940s, he rose in the Naval Reactors Program to direct the Navy’s Advanced Design
Division, and with responsibility for aspects of the first US nuclear power station at
shipping port. Shaw was responsible for the conception of the first generation of
submarine, nuclear aircraft carrier and nuclear cruiser power plants. And, after
transfer to ANL, he assumed even heavier responsibilities: development of nuclear
reactors for civilian and military applications, and nuclear safety. Career biogra-
phies such as Shaw’s illustrate the close alliance between government-sponsored
research, military development and civilian nuclear power in the USA, as well as
the relatively weak role of universities in this even a quarter century after the first
atomic bomb.
8 University of Illinois archives, records of the Argonne Universities Association, Urbana-Champaign,
Illinois, USA (henceforth UI) box 46.
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While Zinn’s ANL strove to set the agenda for American nuclear engineering,
Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) became the centre of early education. Its nucleus
was Clinton Laboratories, wartime home of a reactor group spawned from the Met
Lab. Seeking to establish a national role for themselves, its members fostered post-
war government sponsorship and close links with academe, establishing a graduate
studies partnership with the nearby University of Tennessee and links with
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Its educative role was consolidated by the
separate Clinton Training School in 1946 (known informally as the ‘Clinch College
of Nuclear Knowledge’), focusing on nuclear engineering and physics rather than
biological ramifications. Opened by Eugene Wigner (1902–1995) the former leader
of the Met Lab reactor group, the School attracted some fifty participants from
industry, academe and the military. Influential graduates included Martin Shaw and
Captain Hyman Rickover (1900–1986), later the champion of a nuclear-based navy
(Hewlett and Duncan 1974).
The Clinton Training School closed in 1947 when site management by the
Monsanto Company ended, but fourteen south-eastern universities collaborated that
year to form the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies (ORINS), a government-
owned company-operated facility overseen by the new Atomic Energy Commission
(Poor 1963). ORINS disseminated biologically oriented knowledge, more cleanly
divorced from military applications than was reactor design. Faculty at the
participating universities had access to the Institute’s laboratory facilities. Know-
how on matters such as radiation protection and the medical applications of
radioisotopes was provided to its member universities—with student numbers
stabilizing at some 70 per year by 1950—and further promoted by travelling
lectures by the Institute’s scientists.
A separate initiative, the Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology (ORSORT),
was founded in 1950 to provide classified expertise that universities could not
provide (Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2002; Weinberg 1994). Organised by
physicist Frederick Seitz (1911–2008), its faculty included a half-dozen physicists
from Eugene Wigner’s Met Lab group. American expertise and teaching, then, grew
out of the cluster of physicists and engineers at ANL and ORNL who had emerged
from Chicago’s Met Lab.
Unlike ORINS, which occasionally granted access to Canadian and British
workers, ORSORT was restricted to US citizens.9 Its first-year began with a
complement of 46 solely government-sponsored students drawn from the AEC and
military contractors; during 1951, most students were from industries drawn into
reactor design and operation for the Navy; and, the majority of the following year’s 81
students were those planning careers as nuclear workers at government-funded sites
or with industrial contractors. Most attendees were college graduates holding
Bachelor’s degrees in chemistry, engineering, metallurgy, physics or engineering
physics. As one administrator could argue privately, ORSORT had no academic rival:
While some universities have given occasional special courses… it appears
that the group applying at Oak Ridge are attracted by feeling that the most
9 Atomic Energy Commission (1953) Oak Ridge Operations Information Manual, Budget and Reports
Division [accessed via http://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail.jsp?osti_id=16111668].
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authoritative information is received here and, based on our experience with
ORSORT, would not return to the universities for short courses.10
ANL and ORNL thus played seminal roles, but other government sites helped
shape the discipline. During this period production sites trained their workers for
existing jobs and promotion to new ones. From the late 1940s the Hanford
Technology Course taught topics including nuclear physics, instrumentation,
chemistry and handling, and a more advanced Pile Technology Course focused
on reactor operations.11 Similarly, from 1949 ANL sponsored an Atomic Energy
Institute for some 2,400 teachers and administrators in Chicago area schools, and
had provided special non-credit courses ‘in the fields of chemistry, physics and
reactor engineering with special emphasis on the unique aspects needed in atomic
energy work’.12 Its administrators initially rejected the idea of ‘formal fellowship
programs akin to ORINS and ORSORT’, preferring that their temporary staff
members ‘learn by direct experience in one of the Laboratory projects’.13
British Reliance on Industrial Models
Under the McMahon Act, national programs were largely independent. The wartime
collaboration had nevertheless provided a model for the top–down construction of
the field in the UK, and the US organisation and training was noted, if not directly
experienced, by British nuclear workers. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy
Authority (UKAEA, founded in 1954) trained its own workers mirroring American
practice. The four-week Harwell Isotope School begun in 1951 (Herran 2006), and
joined by a 12-week Reactor School in 1955, were similar to ORINS and ORSORT,
respectively. Calder Hall, site of the first power reactor and operated by the
Production Group, instituting an eight-week Operation School to train plant
operators similar to its Hanford equivalent; by 1957 it had trained 42, in groups
alternating between British and overseas (mainly Commonwealth) students.
Despite such similarities, the etymology of specialist labels reveals national
distinctions. John Cockcroft, Director of Harwell, tentatively termed his workers,
particularly those trained in the Harwell in-house courses, ‘atomic energy
technologists’ (Cockcroft 1954).14 Significantly, this term was unpopular, and
unsupported by labelled occupational posts. While American and Canadian
10 Sapirie, S. R., letter to L., D. C., 1 Sep 1959. Department of Energy CD 59-5-20/FORM 189 [
http://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail.jsp?osti_id=16289444].
11 Brown, C. L. personal notebook, Hanford Technology Course, 15 Oct 1948–8 Oct 1953. Department
of Energy Declassified Document Retrieval System: Hanford Engineering Works archive (online
database, henceforth DOE DDRS, accessed via http://www5.hanford.gov/ddrs) D198027813; DOE
DDRS, Fullmer, G. C. personal notebook, Pile Technology Course, 26 Jan 1950–30 Sep 1960. DOE
DDRS D198027813.
12 Board of Governors’ Minutes, Argonne National Laboratory, 2 May 1950. UI box 44.
13 Boyce, J. C. memo to Council of Participating Institutions, 26 Jan 1951. UI box 134.
14 The term technologist, rising in usage during the 1950s, reflects the new occupation promoted in the
environment of government laboratories, in which scientists and engineers associated more closely than
did their pre-war counterparts.
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institutions unproblematically adopted the term ‘nuclear engineer’ (even if the
content of their special expertise initially was unclear), the British pointedly did not.
The different national trajectory can be ascribed to distinct working cultures and
particularly the influence of one man, Christopher Hinton. Hinton had assumed
responsibility for the UK’s post-war industrial atomic facilities informed by his
experiences as a former engineer at Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and senior
wartime manager of chemical factories. His background encouraged him to
categorise atomic energy and its specialists according to the working culture of ICI
and the technical Civil Service. Compartmentalisation of nuclear facilities in the UK
was different from that in the USA: while the Atomic Energy Research
Establishment at Harwell corresponded to aspects of the Argonne and Oak Ridge
National Laboratories, Hinton’s Production Group had no direct parallel, and more
consistently vaunted engineers over scientists.
With his unique responsibility for its industrial development in the UK –
unparalleled by American and Canadian counterparts—Hinton argued that the
‘correct perspective’ regarding nuclear energy was that it ‘should not be regarded as
a completely new technology, but rather as an extension and development of
existing technologies’ (Hinton 1956, p. 1). An editorialist in the journal Engineering
reiterated this national attitude:
The design of nuclear power plant falls into none of the neat compartments of
engineering that we have come to accept. It is not covered wholly by civil,
mechanical, electrical or even chemical engineering. It is, in fact, spread
across all of them (Editorial 1956).
Even more than Walter Zinn’s seminal influence in shaping expertise at ANL
(and, by extension, the content of American nuclear engineering), Hinton dominated
British understandings of the field; opposing views made little headway. A notable
example was J. V. Dunworth, Head of the UKAEA Reactor Division, who argued
that reactors were orders of magnitude more complex than conventional power
facilities, rejecting ‘the frequently expressed view that nuclear engineering is just
another branch of ordinary engineering’ (Dunworth 1958). Despite a seniority
comparable to Martin Shaw’s in the USA, Dunworth unsuccessfully promoted
nuclear engineering against this institutional momentum.
The UKAEA inherited the staffing structures of its predecessor in the Ministry of
Supply that had continued through and after the war. The established civil service
categories for technical workers included the Professional class of Scientific Officers
(including Assistant, Higher and Executive grades, identified as Chemists, Physi-
cists, Metallurgists or Mathematicians) and Engineers (divided into Chemical, Civil,
Electrical and Mechanical); Industrial grades, incorporating a production hierarchy
based on the Ordnance Factory system; and Craft workers, traditionally trained by
apprenticeship or college courses. In this entrenched system, there was no apparent
slot for nuclear workers per se, and no motivation to create a new category.15
15 In later years, the UKAEA moved from civil service grading to a simpler salary structure, but largely




Not all agreed even that a new discipline and profession should be centred on
engineers. John Cockcroft promoted a division of labour via a science-led,
technician-managed profession, observing that ‘physicists, chemists and metallur-
gists are carrying out a vast research program which will enable the engineer to
build better power reactors’ (Cockcroft 1956). Others in the emerging industry
allocated praise more equitably, even if they presented a hierarchy in tune with the
UKAEA: an editorial in Nuclear Power marked the opening of Calder Hall as ‘the
triumphant answer of a dedicated team of scientists, engineers and craftsmen’.
The dissenting views concerning disciplinary novelty were replayed in the
professional sphere. As Andrew Abbott has argued, disciplinary and occupational
space must be negotiated in the ecology of professions (Abbott 1988). Cockcroft,
diffident about pigeon-holing his new experts, was concerned that the formation of
an American Nuclear Society in 1954 meant that ‘the UK would be placed in an
unfavourable position unless it had some corresponding body not under the direct
control of our own Atomic Energy Authority’. He argued that existing professional
institutions were too fragmented to include ‘any appreciable fraction of our
scientists’ who, in fact, ‘would not be eligible’. Instead, he proposed a new
society.16
Nevertheless, most of his contemporaries favoured a joint effort by three or more
existing groups. Individual professional societies had been scouting territory, too.
The prominent chemist Sir Harold Hartley argued that atomic energy would shift
disciplinary balances: ‘with the lure of nuclear physics and electronics, classical
physicists were a dying race’, he claimed, and ‘chemical engineers have to do the
research’ (Hartley 1953). Christopher Hinton supported Hartley’s view that both
chemical and nuclear engineering be recast as ‘process engineering’ (Divall and
Johnston 2000). Professional societies, too, sought to extend their remit. In 1955,
four institutions—the Civil, Mechanical, Electrical and Chemical Engineers—
collaborated with the Institute of Physics to form a joint body for the advancement
of nuclear technology: the British Nuclear Energy Conference (BNEC). Signifi-
cantly, they agreed that the new specialism was ‘not to be regarded as a completely
new technology, but rather as an extension and development of existing
technologies’ (Hinton 1956). In effect, the organisation promoted a pan-engineering
grouping that weakened professional aspirations but worked overtly in the mutual
interests of industry, government and established technical institutions. Thus, a
template for British nuclear workers was framed by the working practices of earlier
engineers.
Unsurprisingly, key players in the BNEC were Christopher Hinton, its first
Chairman, and board member John Cockcroft. Hinton personified the union of
disciplines, being a Fellow of the Royal Society and member of three of the four
Institutions. This movement by existing professions to occupy seemingly vacant
professional territory also involved quelling potential invasions. The proposed
formation of a separate Institution of Nuclear Engineers (INucE) in 1958, seeking to
form a learned society along the lines of the existing British institutions, provoked
energetic responses. The Civil and Chemical Engineers rehearsed their argument
16 Cockcroft, John. memo to unlisted recipients. 22 Nov 1954. NA AB 19/84.
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that the nuclear industry did not bring into being a new kind of engineer, but merely
a new challenge in the application of existing branches of engineering (Editorial
1958). The Secretary of the INucE could counter only ineffectually that ‘we are a
new creation in a new and expanding field and we are tied to none’ (Editorial
1966).17
Canadian Extension of the Wartime Context
By contrast, a single site at Chalk River, Ontario, engaged in research and
development of atomic energy in Canada while eschewing weapons options. There,
the institutionalisation of nuclear engineering shared features of both the American
and British experiences. Founded in the final year of the war from the Anglo-
Canadian group based at Montreal (Williams 2000), and directed for a time by John
Cockcroft, the isolated facility at Chalk River soon became the largest project of
Canada’s National Research Council (NRC) and was spun-off in 1952 as a separate
Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL).
AECL pursued the Harwell and Oak Ridge model of training, beginning its own
training courses for its various professional and craft workers in 1958. Two years
later, it instituted the Chalk River Reactor School, but teaching to home and
international students ‘the basic principles of reactors available to those qualified
engineers and scientists who desire to gain practical knowledge in their design and
operation’.18
Canadian nuclear workers had some unique features, however. As in the UK, pre-
existing industrial organisation provided a model for the new field. From its origin
in 1916, the NRC had been directed by engineers and pursued mainly goal-oriented
scientific research, employing a then-unusual complement of scientists, engineers
and technicians. This intermingling of disciplines shaped the working culture at
Chalk River: the hierarchy of roles common at Argonne and Harwell (scientists
above engineers) was downplayed, and there was openness to new and more fluid
categories of expertise.
Moreover, Canada had publicly rejected nuclear weapons development (although
it benefited indirectly from the plutonium economy, selling plutonium extracted
from its reactors solely to the USA). The Canadian work, unlike the British
spectrum of efforts in exploring and developing atomic energy, was geographically
and intellectually focused. Continuing the wartime research begun in Montreal,
Chalk River personnel concentrated on developing a single reactor technology (the
heavy-water CANDU reactor system). This further distinguished the expertise of its
home-grown nuclear specialists.
A decade after the production of the first atomic bomb, then, nuclear engineering
and its specialists were part of a shadowy field. Uniquely for a coalescing discipline,
they had been defined by their work for a single employer: their respective
17 The INucE never attained the professional cachet of the ‘big four’ engineering institutions, but offered
a commercial periodical and conference venues to bring nuclear workers together.
18 AECL. The university graduate and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1959. Library and Archives
Canada (henceforth LAC) MG30 B59 Vol 8.
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governments. Their developing expertise remained insulated by secrecy and shaped
by regional ambitions or prevailing industrial cultures. Their education took place
almost exclusively at, or in collaboration with, government laboratories rather than
at universities. This segregation hampered dialogue and integration with other
scientific and engineering disciplines, limited their professional aspirations and
constrained careers. Thanks to State sponsorship, nuclear engineers in each country
were truly a breed apart.
Triggered Release: The Declassification of Nuclear Knowledge
The first two discrete phases of nuclear engineering—wartime military development
from c1940 to 1945, and then post-war engineering exploration 1946 to c1955—
vaunted the products of nuclear workers but kept the specialists themselves hidden
from public view (Del Sesto 1986, Weart 1988; Forgan 2003). A new phase, c1955–
1962, introducing the nascent discipline to the academic sphere alongside the first
commercial exploitation, was again triggered by American initiatives.19
The opening act was a 1953 speech to the United Nations by President
Eisenhower. ‘Atoms for Peace’ was the outcome of his government’s efforts to
publicise to Americans the ‘age of peril’ created by the loss of the monopoly on
nuclear weapons and the growing momentum of the Cold War. Over the following
months, however, the US administration, noting that the speech had put the Soviet
Union on the defensive, decided to follow up with examples of ‘the social
improvement which can be expected to follow from the peaceful application of
nuclear energy’. Among the recommendations affecting the teaching of nuclear
engineering was a draft plan to open up the Oak Ridge isotopes school to
‘instructors and students from all of the free world’; to stimulate discussions ‘in the
labour and management field’ regarding the non-military application of atomic
energy; and, most relevantly, ‘to endow new chairs, revision, modernization and
improved distribution of text books and technical magazines’.20 Beginning as a
media-wise re-education of the American public, ‘Atoms for Peace’ opened
possibilities for American-led dissemination of not-so-secret atomic secrets and,
with it, a more open discipline.
From 1954, American efforts began to focus on explicit training routes. Hanford
hosted a School of Nuclear Engineering sponsored by General Electric, and ANL
instituted a seven month School of Nuclear Science and Engineering, vaunted by the
AEC as ‘one of the major projects under the Atoms for Peace program to assist
peoples of friendly nations to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy’.21 In 1957
19 Subsequent periods, involving consolidation of nuclear power programs c1963–1985 and a subsequent
retrenchment of the field following anti-nuclear movements and dramatic failures such as Chernobyl, are
beyond the scope of this paper.
20 Operations Coordinating Board. A program to exploit the A-bank proposals in the President’s UN
speech of December 8, 1953. 4 Feb 1954. Eisenhower Presidential Library, accessed via
http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/dl/Atoms_For_Peace/Binder11.pdf.
21 Argonne National Laboratory. Minutes. Inter-institution committee for considering a cooperative
effort for advanced nuclear engineering education. 20 Dec 1955. UI box 100.
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ORSORT itself linked with a half-dozen higher education institutions to offer a two-
year curriculum in nuclear engineering, and in 1960 it admitted its first non-
American students. Brookhaven National Lab, too, could report education measures
by the late 1950s. Chief among these was an annual 10-week summer laboratory
program and ‘a number of ad hoc courses of a few weeks’ duration, chiefly for
nuclear engineers’.22
Eisenhower’s initiative prompted international responses. During 1955—exactly
a decade after the use of atomic bombs had ended the Second World War, and
nearly 15 years after the first research to develop them—nuclear specialists and
their expertise became more visible. The event that signalled this flow of
information was the first ‘International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy’ held in Geneva during the summer of 1955. The Geneva conference
represented more than a commemoration and political act; it also promoted the first
serious attempts to create a new industry. Eisenhower’s political gesture had been
followed by legislation, notably the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which ended the
government monopoly of atomic energy processes, production, materials and
training. In effect, it opened the possibility of a civilian nuclear era in the United
States. Together, ‘Atoms for Peace’, the revised Atomic Energy Act and the Geneva
Conference opened an academic route for nuclear engineering.
The year following the conference, the new Calder Hall power station, the first
significant and widely publicised civilian application of nuclear power, was
completed next to the Windscale ‘plutonium factory’ piles in England. The secret
activity of bomb production was now twinned with an important civilian
application. Nomenclature underwent a transition, too: the wide-ranging atomic
energy projects were being recast as more focused nuclear power projects. Post-war
enthusiasms for all things atomic were redirected and pared down. Radioisotopes
proved important in defining the new field of medical physics (Kraft 2006) and
became a small, if profitable, by-product of reactors in several countries
(particularly in Canada, where AECL focused its early profit-making aspirations
in a Commercial Products Division to market them), and somewhat later in the USA
(Creager 2004). In the face of public resistance, the irradiation of foods to extend
their shelf-life proved difficult to commercialise (Buchanan 2005). Early spurts of
publicity were sidelined, particularly the agricultural hopes for new breeds of crop
from irradiated plants and schemes for peaceful civil engineering applications of
atomic bombs such as the excavating of hills, harbours and river courses (for
analyses of the principal American initiative, Project PLOWSHARE, see, for
example, Cosgrove 1998 and Frenkel 1998).
The relaxation of security encouraged key actors to direct the training of a new
generation. The UK and USA continued to steer distinct courses in defining nuclear
engineers, despite the same nominal goals of bomb development, civil applications
and national prestige. And in Canada, without military aspirations or urgency to
pursue immediate applications, discipline-building drew increasingly on American
experiences. Indeed, from the mid 1950s, a number of countries began to conceive
22 Brookhaven National Laboratory. Brookhaven 1960–1982 and its Associated Universities. UI box 35.
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the co-development of nuclear power and nuclear engineering expertise; the case of
Spain, for example, has been discussed recently (Salom 2005).
Altering Cross-sections: Avoiding Categorisation in the UK
As discussed above, in the UK the dominance of established professions, coupled
with an ingrained industrial working culture and pragmatic administrators, militated
against a university discipline. Nevertheless, new specialist journals, liberated by
the lowering of secrecy, lobbied for open training. Nuclear energy demanded, said
The Engineer, ‘the accumulated knowledge and experience of conventional
branches of engineering, adapted in varying degree to meet a new application’,
although ‘the initial problems remains—the dissemination of knowledge to start this
process’ (Editorial 1955). Nuclear Engineering argued that future educational
facilities should exist not only at the atomic energy establishments, but also at
schools, universities and technical colleges. The young journal consequently
promoted post-graduate education via an annual scholarship for students having a
prior degree in engineering, physics, chemistry or metallurgy, the disciplines that it
argued were the basis of nuclear engineering.
There were also internal pressures to extend training. The Ministry of Education
wanted Technical School courses to take over the Harwell Reactor School’s
introductory 6 weeks so that it could focus on more advanced topics, and judged
that three college courses would suffice for England’s manpower requirements.23
Harwell itself was tugged by opposing forces during this period: by the need to
promote itself as ‘a kind of university where the staff, having obtained knowledge
and information, were free to go to other universities and instruct people’; to support
the UK nuclear power program; and even by distinct groups within the UKAEA
who sought diversification outside the field of nuclear energy (Spence 1967). A
trickle of further education courses consequently began to appear in 1956, mainly in
the form of short introductions.24 The proliferation of disparate courses, inspired by
entrepreneurial initiatives to capture vaguely defined audiences, encouraged the
Ministry of Education to limit and approve validated courses.
In parallel with these introductory courses, Harwell mounted the Reactor School
for more advanced training. Much of the curriculum of the 3-month, 150 h School
appeared distinctly novel.25 Here again, Christopher Hinton exerted a strong
influence. Opposing what he saw as the model of ‘some of the American
Universities and Colleges of Technology… running training courses for ‘nuclear
23 Board of Education and successors: Technical Branch and Further Education Branch: Registered Files
(T Series). NA ED 46/1062.
24 Early examples included Borough Polytechnic in London, Acton Technical College, Birkenhead
Technical College, Battersea Polytechnic, Leeds College of Technology and the North West Kent College
of Technology.
25 It included background on reactor theory; engineering (temperature distributions in reactors, thermal
stresses and kinetic behaviour of reactors); chemical engineering and metallurgy (manufacturing
moderators and fuel elements, and extracting bred fissile material from them); and, more advanced topics
such as electromagnetic pumps for liquid metal coolants and various types of power generating reactors.
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engineers’’, his earliest proposals envisaged an extension of university-taught
chemical engineering curricula to embrace the new nuclear skills:
In the chemical engineering schools the application has been to the
engineering of chemical plants. Might it not be better to broaden our ideas…
to process engineering? It then seems to me that we have a fourth major
engineering field, and in this field it would be reasonable to include a course of
lectures on nuclear engineering.26
Hinton lobbied the Universities of Manchester and Cambridge for nuclear energy
or process engineering courses suitable for current and anticipated Authority staff.
Manchester, well sited for the nuclear sites concentration in northwest England,
offered a single post-graduate nuclear engineering course in 1954. Even supporters
of the plan, who noted that the head of its Engineering Department was ‘really quite
keen’, reported that nuclear engineering courses within the chemical engineering
department were impracticable given the already heavily loaded syllabus.
Frustrated by their lack of response, Hinton was pragmatic about a suitable
disciplinary home for such teaching, complaining that Prof T. R. C. Fox (1912–
1962), in the Cambridge Chemical Engineering Department and member of the
Atomic Energy Council, was cool to the proposal, unlike his counterpart in
Mechanical Engineering: ‘Although I always thought that chemical engineering was
the proper framework for the new nuclear subjects, if Baker is prepared to take
action on the mechanical engineering side I think he should be encouraged’.
Similarly, Hinton judged that the University of Manchester’s weaker staffing in the
‘heavily biased… chemistry side’ of its College of Technology would make it easier
to ‘graft a course in nuclear engineering’ onto the Mechanical Engineering
offerings.27 Disciplinary homes were just as malleable elsewhere. Heriot Watt
University was considering a course on Power Generation by Nuclear Reactors
within its Electrical Engineering Department. And a survey of Imperial College
departments in 1957 indicated that several of them taught a smattering of nuclear
subjects.28 Influenced by such local university contexts, the emerging discipline thus
developed along the parallel lines of expertise in chemical separation and
transformation of materials (through chemical engineering) and power generation,
thermodynamics, control mechanisms and shielding (through mechanical and,
occasionally, electrical engineering).
As suggested by this decanting of expertise into disparate departments, Hinton
hoped to shape the nature of its university teaching by situating nuclear engineering
as a post-graduate or on-the-job adaptation of conventional engineering skills—
rehearsing the experience of his first cohort of UKAEA engineers. Approached to
recommend an appointment for a new chair of Nuclear Engineering at Queen Mary
College, London, Hinton observed disparagingly that it would be ‘difficult to find a
26 Hinton, Christopher, letter to Harold Hartley. 4 Aug 1954. NA AB 19/84.
27 Hinton, Christopher, letters to J. M. Kay. 4 Jan 1955 and 22 Dec 1954. NA AB 19/84.
28 The departments of Physics, Mathematics, Chemistry, Metallurgy and Mechanical Engineering
offered some 12–50 h each of lecture-based courses to undergraduate students [letters, Nuclear Science
Instruction—UGC enquiry 1957 (File No. 571), 1957. Imperial College Archives, London, UK
(henceforth IC) GB 0098 KNP/3/1].
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man with experience in this field’ and suggested instead that they pick a
conventional academic engineer who could be further trained at Harwell for
6 months.29 He argued privately, ‘the last thing we want to do is to treat Nuclear
Power as a separate technology’ and, a few days later, ‘I think that it would be better
to think of it as an additional field in which students can practise the application of
the basic engineering principles which ought to form the backbone of their
University course’.30 He dictated the same message a year later to the newly
appointed professor, John Menzies Kay (1920–1995), who had taught chemical
engineering at Cambridge from 1948 and had then been Chief Technical Engineer—
Hinton’s subordinate—from 1952. Not surprisingly, Kay correspondingly proposed
an Authority-inspired curriculum:
It has been suggested in some quarters that ‘nuclear engineering’ is a basic
subject which should take its place alongside civil, mechanical, electrical and
chemical engineering. This view, however, is not shared by any engineers of
standing who are actively engaged in the development of nuclear power… It
has been found necessary within the Atomic Energy Authority and in the
engineering industry to build up large teams of mechanical, civil, electrical
and chemical engineers to handle these projects. These engineers, while
working in the field of nuclear power, and acquiring special knowledge that
might be described under the term ‘nuclear engineering’, in fact remain
primarily as mechanical, civil, electrical or chemical engineers, respec-
tively…This point of view also leads naturally to the present proposal for a
postgraduate course in nuclear power at Imperial College which would be
open to men who have already graduated in one of the recognized basic
branches of engineering.31
Basing curricula on guesses for the potential market as well as experts such as
Hinton meant that the complement and level of university courses varied.32 Initially
entrepreneurial forays into what the College directors hoped would be a burgeoning
market, such courses replaced Ministry-mandated and Harwell-inspired offerings
(Divall 1991; Yeo 1997).
The rise of academic training created its own tensions within the UKAEA. The
original generation of nuclear workers recruited by Christopher Hinton—pioneers in
29 Hinton, Christopher, letter to T. P. Creed. 23 Nov 1955. NA AB 19/84.
30 Hinton, Christopher, letters to O. A. Saunders. 5 and 9 Jan 1956. NA AB 7/40.
31 Kay, John M. Imperial College, 4 Jan 1957. NA AB 19/84.
32 University: nuclear engineering 1954–1957 Train/1. NA AB 19/84. King’s College, Newcastle,
predicting the rise of marine applications, discussed a nuclear engineering course oriented towards the
naval industry [Advisory Panel in Chemical Engineering. Minutes, 20 Feb 1957. King’s College
Newcastle archives]. The University of Glasgow instituted a more general course in 1956 shared between
the Natural Philosophy (i.e. Physics) and Engineering departments (news item 1956c). Birmingham
University began a one-year M.Sc. course in reactor physics and technology in its Physics Department in
1956 and, a year later, Nottingham University offered familiarization courses in nuclear engineering for
graduate level students, with Queen Mary College, London, offering a nuclear engineering option in its
BSc in Electrical Engineering. Cambridge offered a course on reactor theory and in 1958 Imperial
College began graduate courses in Nuclear Power (in the Department of Mechanical Engineering) and
Nuclear Technology (in the Department of Chemical Engineering).
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the developing art but without formal training—increasingly found themselves
sidelined or even demoted in the organisation’s hierarchy as a newly trained but
inexperienced cohort joined their ranks. As one relegated to a study of workplace
contamination complained, he was reduced to polishing brass doorknobs (Millar
1956).
American Academic Definition
The story was different in the USA. Although triggered by the lowering of security
concerns and pressed forward by governmental and industrial pressure to support
the emerging nuclear industry, a national consensus developed that supported
nuclear engineering as a discipline.
The haste to illustrate the civilian application of nuclear energy drove academic
nuclear engineering. During the late 1950s American universities began to usurp the
role of Oak Ridge’s seminal course, ORSORT, in training nuclear workers and, with
strong government incentives, strove to expand the academic presence of nuclear
engineering. In the face of predictions of an annual national demand for some ‘2,000
engineers and scientists—mostly engineers’, power company executives in the
southern states lobbied for government support of college and university training
programs. Demonstration projects such as the Nautilus submarine and nuclear
power plants created a demand for ‘design engineers, construction supervisors,
operating and maintenance engineers… specifically trained for this field and fully
aware of its stringent requirements’ (Folger and Meeks 1957, p. 116).
Nevertheless, the national laboratories, along with their associated university
consortia, played a diffident role in defining educational standards for the new subject
and transferring teaching responsibility to academic institutions. In 1955, for
example, ANL sponsored an ‘inter-institution committee for considering a cooper-
ative effort for advanced nuclear engineering education’ with eight of its
participating universities. Norman Hilberry, its Deputy Director, argued that
‘engineers… need a greater appreciation of the nuclear problems… than would
come from their cursory associations during their undergraduate years’, but the
deficit could be made up by an increase in Argonne’s teaching facilities.33 Indeed, it
seemed that universities were not up to the mark. Andrew Longacre, the University
of Illinois representative, more pointedly suggested the frustrations felt by university
departments tasked with teaching nuclear engineering. His argument, widely shared
among his colleagues, stressed the promiscuous sources of the new subject, which
rested upon essentially a relatively small number of scientists. There had been
no nuclear engineering prior to the war, and the requirements… had no
counterpart in any other field of engineering. The people that pioneered
nuclear technology were of various backgrounds and developed their
proficiency by on-the-job training and experience.34
33 Argonne National Laboratory. Minutes, Inter-institution committee for considering a cooperative
effort for advanced nuclear engineering education. 20 Dec 1955. UI box 100.
34 Longacre, Andrew. ‘Proposal for a cooperative facility for education in nuclear engineering’, Nov
1955. UI Box 100.
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Longacre warned that introducing nuclear engineering curricula comparable to
those in other branches of engineering would be difficult, ‘owing to the lack of
adequately trained staff … Government laboratories and industrial contractors
absorbed the few persons receiving on-the-job training or formal education in those
schools offering anything resembling appropriate courses’. The first generation of
academic staff had relatively brief industrial experience and engineering degrees in
other subjects supplemented by short courses that could be traced back to ORSORT.
Few universities, he suggested, would be able to attract competent teaching staff,
and ‘would either have to wait before instituting nuclear engineering curricula or
cope with an inferior staff’. Even worse, he observed that the intellectual
foundations of the field were unsettled. Unlike established academic fields, nuclear
engineering did not have even ‘tacit agreement fostered by text books and
professional societies, etc., as to what constitutes adequate preparation’.35
While recognising these problems, the committee opted to press ahead with
higher education programs, deciding that each institution should, with government
support, provide the courses and facilities necessary for a core program in nuclear
engineering on their own campuses. In return, ANL would provide more elaborate
facilities and serve as a ‘finishing’ school for graduate students and for short
courses, conferences and teacher training.
The fraught transition from restricted education at the national labs to an open
university environment was nevertheless enduring. The chronic shortage of trained
staff to meet the rapid expansion, as signalled by Longacre in the mid-1950s,
continued. Exacerbating the lack of teaching materials was the scarcity of qualified
teachers, most of whom had received some first-hand experience with nuclear
reactors and equipment in an AEC laboratory.36 The University of Cincinnati
advertised desperately in 1959 for ‘a staff scientist who is preferably an
Experimental Physicist, Electrical Engineer, Nuclear Engineer or someone with a
Ph.D in any of the other engineering areas. Experience in the area of reactor
operation is desirable, but not necessary…’37 Some early nuclear engineering
programs were forced to define criteria of expertise in relation to the handful of
basic texts, one advertisement requiring ‘a good working knowledge of reactor
analysis at the Glasstone and Edlund level’.38
As this quotation suggests, texts were an important early channel for defining and
consolidating the content of nuclear engineering in the USA. Pile Theory, the first
and influential text on the theory of reactors, was a summary of ORSORT lectures
35 Ibid.
36 The University of Arizona, for example, began a programme in 1959 under Lynn Weaver (b 1930).
Weaver had not worked on the Manhattan project or national laboratories but, with two degrees in
electrical engineering under his belt, gained experience from 1953 on a Convair Corporation programme
to design a nuclear-powered bomber, where he began to study reactor control problems. Weaver took one
course from a graduate of ORSORT, and absorbed more from the handful of texts then becoming
available. Most of his half-dozen teaching staff had worked at an industrial firm, General Atomics,
contracted to produce a reactor design for space flight applications [Weaver, Lynn. Interview with Sean F.
Johnston. 3 Mar 2007].
37 Roberson, John H., letter to Warren F. Stubbins. 28 Sep 1959. UI box 83.
38 Iowa State University. Dept of Nuclear Engineering advertisement 27 Sep 1960. UI box 83.
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by four Met Lab physicists (Soodak and Campbell 1950). The 71 page simplified
exposition was later superseded by a considerably expanded treatment (Glasstone
and Edlund 1952) but as the foreword to Pile Theory emphasised, ‘the greatest part
of the work is still classified, and probably will remain so for some time’ [p. vii].
The dearth of a suitable catechism of instruction was apparent to educators. A
professor of Engineering Mechanics noted that
the choice of textbooks from which to teach … is very limited, and the
majority of the texts published to date have been written by nuclear scientists
rather than professional educators. As a result, books in this field are
characterized (from the teacher’s viewpoint) by poor arrangement of topics,
lack of continuity and integration of approach to the subject, completely
inadequate problems for student solution, both in quantity and in nature, and
by inconsistency of numerical data. It is also noticeable from the textbooks
that, unlike the situation in many other engineering fields, very few standard
analytical methods and design techniques have been developed.39
Academics were faced with the problem of defining adequate curricula for the
still malleable intellectual foundations of the field, but were equally challenged in
specifying the desirable characteristics of their graduates, shaped by rapidly
developing industrial opportunities. Notre Dame University, for instance, opted for
a graduate program ‘with the emphasis on fundamental concepts rather than on
technology. The program of instruction was originally conceived as one in reactor
physics and in instrumentation, built on a sound background in atomic and nuclear
physics and on some chemical physics’.40 Other institutions stressed engineering
design, but all struggled to obtain adequate laboratories and competent teachers.
The difficulties in hastily defining an adequate intellectual basis for a curriculum
are further illustrated by the case of Wayne State University. Government pressures
were an important consideration in motivating a program: its Associate Professor of
Engineering Mechanics felt ‘an obligation to provide training and education in the
rapidly expanding field of nuclear science and engineering’ imposed by ‘the
hundreds of millions of dollars allocated by the AEC to the objective of promoting
education in this field’. But his enthusiasm was tempered; he cautioned that the
rapid evolution of the field, pressed by strong government direction, made teaching
the subject difficult:
Nuclear Engineering is still extremely young as branches (or sub-branches) of
engineering go; it is still changing with a rapidity almost unprecedented in the
evolutionary history of technology (even so-called ‘fundamental constants’
may vary from day to day); opinions of both professional educators and
practitioners in the field still diverge widely over what constitutes a proper
nuclear engineering education.41
39 Perry, C. C. memo. Nuclear engineering at Wayne State University. 6 Apr 1959. UI box 22.
40 Newman, M. K., letter to J. H. Roberson. 17 Feb 1960. UI box 85.
41 See note 39.
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His concerns were echoed by many academics and university administrators at
the end of the decade. Even the Director of the Associated Midwest Universities,
closely linked to ANL, responded to one potential student of the subject, ‘I am
somewhat reluctant to offer any guidance with respect to the comparability of the
nuclear engineering programs because it is a difficult subject and I am not too well
versed’.42
In 1958 a Nuclear Engineering Education Committee (NEEC) was formally
established by the Midwest universities collaborating with ANL (Greenbaum 1971),
seeking to formulate policies on university cooperation with ANL and on
educational programs originated by the AEC. Its vision of nuclear engineering
was nevertheless contested then and later—a legacy of the National Laboratory
system and, in particular, the role of Walter Zinn in defining the remit of ANL.
There were, then, crucial elements impeding the process of disciplinisation at
American universities: a shortage of qualified practitioners and educators; an
absence of suitable teaching materials and course curricula; and, a lack of an
authoritative body of experts able to define, approve and regulate academic
standards in the field.
To address such concerns, the Atomic Energy Commission consulted with an
established organisation, the American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE)
and its new Nuclear Committee, to establish programs that would procure
appropriate equipment for university departments, publish texts and develop
faculty. From 1960, this was extended with the involvement of the young American
Nuclear Society (ANS). Noting that ‘current programs differ significantly from one
another because of varying educational philosophies among institutions as well as
differences in calibre, education, and experience of faculties’, the ANS and ASEE
study set out to identify ‘the attributes of formal education in nuclear engineering’,
and with it the means of accrediting nuclear engineers.43 Their report was seminal in
defining the American discipline and profession.
Having no British or Canadian counterpart, the ANS/ASEE committee argued for
the existence of a new technical discipline rather than a cobbled-together assortment
of subjects. It specified nuclear engineering as ‘that branch of engineering directly
concerned with the release, control and utilization of all types of energy from
nuclear sources’:
Nuclear engineering includes the design and development of systems, such as
fission or fusion reactors, for the controlled release of nuclear energy and the
applications of radiation… The central area of interest in nuclear engineering
involves the solution of those problems in which the unique nature of nuclear
energy presents the major challenge. Typical nuclear engineering problems
arise, for example, from the high effective temperatures which occur at the
instant of energy release, the intense radiation of photons or particles which
accompany the release process, the factors involved in maintaining the energy
release on a continuous, controlled basis, the necessity for protection of
42 Roberson, John H., letter to E. L. Multhaup. 11 Apr 1960. UI box 83.
43 American Nuclear Society 1960. ASEE Report on objective criteria in nuclear engineering education.
Queens University Archives, Kingston, Canada, Sargent fonds, Series III Box 4.
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personnel from radiation, including the safe handling of reactor materials,
irradiated materials and radioisotopes, and the use of radioactive materials.44
Nuclear engineers, they argued, required expertise in reactor analysis and design;
analysis of radiation effects; shielding design; utilisation of radiation, processing
and control of radioactive materials, and nuclear energy systems design. The
committee argued that its list of essential and unique content made a strong case for
demarcating a discipline.
As a degree of uniformity spread through American university curricula, Higher
Education adapted to teach employed workers and, even more importantly,
university educators themselves. Educators and commercial nuclear engineers of the
first generation were typically taught via one- to two-month summer courses, funded
jointly by the AEC and the universities; thereafter, regular undergraduate and
graduate courses became the norm. As a discipline, American nuclear engineering
thus saw a two-decade transition from direct government sponsorship to increasing
industrial and academic definition. In 1965 ORSORT—the post-war paradigm for
the new American discipline—finally closed as more independent university
programs became established. Perhaps the best recognition of the nascent discipline
and profession was the attention drawn to it by at least one sociological study
(Vollmer and Mills 1962).45 By the mid 1960s, then, American nuclear engineer-
ing—unlike its British counterpart—had been established in the academic sphere.46
Conclusion: A State-managed Discipline
The implantation of nuclear engineering in the academic realm represents an
unusual case of disciplinary formation. Not only was it distinctly different in three
of the first countries in which it occurred, but also was directed explicitly by their
respective governments. Indeed, this account focuses relatively little on engineers
themselves in advancing discipline creation, and devotes attention instead to State
institutions, senior officials, technical administrators and educators. This unusual
‘outside-in’ construction of an academic field is unique to nuclear engineering. At
least three key factors can be identified to explain these national trajectories.
First, the constraints of secrecy imposed by wartime security and the post-war
McMahon Act created regionally distinct profiles of nuclear workers and early
educators. Similar security policies in the UK and Canada, both of which sought to
resume more open relations with the American nuclear program, inhibited an
academic identity for the subject through the 1950s.
44 Ibid.
45 Extending the studies of industrial sociologist Nelson N. Foote on the American car industry, Vollmer
and Mills argued that nuclear technology showed evidence of ‘rudimentary professionalization of labour’,
notably theoretical formulations supporting specialised techniques, collegial association of its experts,
growing recognition by a wider community, and an awareness of public health and safety as a criterion of
professional responsibility.
46 The Canadian implementation was along similar disciplinary lines to its American counterpart, but
chronically limited by small student numbers and relatively few occupational sites.
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Second, existing technical cultures, particularly in the UK and Canada, imposed
their labour categories on nuclear workers. Christopher Hinton, the powerful shaper
of the British nuclear production organisation, mapped the expertise of nuclear
workers onto wartime civil service chemical workers and thereby damped
occupational, disciplinary and professional ambitions. And in Canada, Chalk River
inherited the norms of disciplinary cooperation developed at the pre-war National
Research Council. Segregated national laboratories further encouraged divergent
working cultures. AEC administrators such as Walter Zinn at ANL assembled
disciplinary groupings that mirrored their own background.
Third, the involvement of the State (via the AEC in the USA, UKAEA in Britain
and AECL in Canada) determined both the goals and pace of academic
representation. The creation of nuclear industries during the late 1950s in these
countries, driven by active government promotion, was accompanied by sponsor-
ship of hastily mounted, and often ambiguously conceived, university programs.47
In contrast to other engineering disciplines, then, which in general entered academe
more slowly and with closer industrial alliances, the emergence of nuclear
engineering in its variant national forms was a story of a State-managed discipline.
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